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The declared homestead exemption: 
Title Trust Deed Serv. Co. v Pearson, 2005 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
“Declared” homestead exemption that predates creditor’s default judgment reduces 
amount creditor may recover from surplus remaining after sale of debtor’s real 
property. 
Title Trust Deed Serv. Co. v Pearson (2005) 132 CA4th 168, 33 CR3d 311 
In October 1997, Heritage Rehabilitation sued Pearson and his mother for money owed for 
nursing services, alleging that Pearson’s mother had transferred her residence to Pearson in order 
to avoid paying her debt to Heritage. In December 1997, Pearson obtained a loan subject to a 
deed of trust secured by the property. Title Trust was the trustee. Pearson failed to repay the loan. 
In January 1998, Pearson recorded a declaration of homestead on the property under CCP 
§704.920. In April, Heritage obtained a $17,514 default judgment against Pearson, and recorded 
an abstract of judgment. Subsequently, Pearson used the residence as security for bail bonds, 
issued by Billingslea, for himself and two others who had been arrested. All the parties failed to 
appear. 
On May 5, 2003, Title Trust conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the property. After 
payment to the beneficiary, there was a surplus of $99,667. Several claims were submitted:  
Pearson claimed entitlement to all the surplus funds;  Heritage claimed the amount of its 1998 
judgment against Pearson; and Billingslea claimed amounts associated with the three bail bonds. 
On May 23, Title Trust Deed Service filed an interpleader against the claiming parties and 
deposited the surplus funds into court. Pearson belatedly asserted his homestead claim and 
moved to amend his answer to raise the homestead issue. The trial court denied the motion, 
finding that the proceeds of the sale were not exempt from execution to satisfy the outstanding 
money judgment under Spencer v Lowery (1991) 235 CA3d 1636, 1 CR2d 795. In December, 
Heritage and Billingslea each filed a motion for summary adjudication, which the trial court 
granted, entering judgments payable from the surplus fund for over $29,000 to Heritage and over 
$18,000 to Billingslea. 
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred in denying Pearson’s motion to 
amend his answer to claim the declared homestead exemption. California has two types of 
homestead exemptions: automatic and recorded or declared. A declared or recorded homestead, 
under CCP §704.950(c), provides that a judgment lien attaches to a declared homestead in the 
amount of any surplus over: All liens and encumbrances already on the homestead at the time the 
abstract of judgment creating the judgment lien is recorded; and  The §704.950 homestead 
exemption. 
Here, Heritage’s judgment lien attached to the property in May 1998, several months after 
Pearson recorded his declaration of homestead (in January 1998). Accordingly, Pearson’s motion 
for leave to amend his answer should have been granted, the judgment in favor of Heritage must 
be reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to determine the validity 
and amount of Pearson’s declared homestead. 
Whether Heritage or Billingslea were entitled to any portion of the surplus would depend, 
first, on the trial court’s determination of the homestead exemption’s validity and, assuming it is 
valid, then on the determined amount of the exemption. That amount, in turn, would dictate how 
much surplus amount will remain to satisfy Heritage and Billingslea’s claims. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: I think this case holds that when there is a surplus following a 
trustee sale, junior lienors can reach it without regard to any automatic homestead 
exemption—but when there is a declared homestead exemption, they can do so only after 
the exempt amount has been first set aside for the debtor. (I say that I think this is the result, 
because the opinion is so riddled with quotations from other cases that it is almost 
impossible to keep anything straight.) 
The logic for making this distinction appears to be that the automatic homestead, under 
Spencer v Lowry (1991) 235 CA3d 1636, 1 CR2d 795, does not reach surplus proceeds after a 
trustee sale because there was never any action or judgment against the debtor to trigger its 
application. On the other hand, under Smith v James A. Merrill, Inc. (1998) 64 CA4th 94, 75 
CR2d 108, a declared homestead protects that same surplus as against all later filed judgment 
liens.  
Since Billingslea, the bail bondsman, claimed as a trust deed beneficiary rather than a 
judgment lienor, I wonder why he fit under that analysis at all. Didn’t his deeds of trust take 
priority over the homestead—whether it was automatic or declared—under CCP §704.940? 
(Of course, if that really is correct, then Billingslea might be prior to Pearson in a declared 
homestead, while at the same time junior to Heritage-who came first-even though Heritage 
would be junior to Pearson’s declared homestead protection. Neat circular priority!)—Roger 
Bernhardt 
 
